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THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDY OF RELIGION* 
By W. R. GEDDES 
IT seems to me that the purpose of an inaugural lecture gi ~'en to an audience 
comprised in part of persons from different fields of study should be either to 
explain the nature and broad significance of one's own subject or to show its relevance 
to some particular topic of general interest. Only two years ago my predecessor 
in this Chair, Professor J. A. Barnes, dealt in his inaugural lecture with the history 
and present status of social anthropology. I could not equal his brilliant exposition, 
and there would be no point in my trying to do so. Instead, I propose to take the 
second course and to attempt to show what light anthropology may throw on the 
topic of religion. I shall try to explain very briefly some of the theories which 
anthropologists have developed to account for religion and then, rashly, I intend to 
step beyond the role of an anthropologist to discuss how adequate any or all of these 
theories are for a complete understanding of religion. 
Last year, on the green in the sunshine outside this hall, another speaker, also 
referring to himself as a student of anthropology, spoke of religion to a far larger 
audience than this. In that address Dr. Graham said that religion-in this case 
religion as laid down in the Bible-was either completely true or it was the greatest 
hoax in the history of mankind. Not many anthropologists would accept either 
alternative. It is true that with very few exceptions anthropologists are not believers 
in specific creeds. Faced with the great relativity of moral standards in different 
cultures and a wide variety of supernatural concepts, it is extremely difficult for them 
to accept any particular dogma as valid for all mankind. But even those who are 
complete unbelievers in any creed know that religion is not a hoax, at least not in 
any simple sense, for it expresses and supports values important to man both in his 
social and his personal life. 
This was not always the case with anthropologists. The suggestion that religion 
was a hoax gained some support from earlier theorists. Tylor, writing in 1871, said 
of magic that it is " an elaborate and systematic pseudo-science. It is, in fact, a 
sincere but fallacious system of philosophy".l He took the same view in regard to 
religion which, he said, in its primary form of animism attempts to explain the 
features and forces of nature by endowing them with a vitality similar to that of 
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human beings. The supernatural is thus on Tylor's view not a deliberately per-
petrated hoax but it is an illusion born of intellectual mistake. 
The theory should not be dismissed lightly. A principal feature of it is that it 
holds that magic and religion are intellectual products, the former springing from 
man's efforts to control nature and the latter from his efforts both to control and 
explain it. In this it contains an important measure of truth. If TyIor, like Comtt' 
before him and Spencer and Frazer later, erred in making religion too rationalistic. 
his fault is little greater than that of many recent anthropologists who have shown an 
almost equally exclusive concern with the social functions of religion. 
But the theory of Tylor and other theories of the same purely rationalistic order 
have serious defects. As Goode points out in a recent book, any entirely rationalistic 
theory fails to take into account the emotional, obligatory character of religious 
beliefs and practices. 2 If the theory further states that the reasoning is fallacious, 
then it becomes very difficult to explain the relationship which religion clearly has to 
social values. A much earlier critic, Emile Durkheim, argued that it was inconceivable 
that so persistent an element in human life as religion should not reflect some 
" reality". We shall return to Durkheim's theory presently in order to show what 
was the reality he had in mind. 
The theory that religion is an illusion was advanced from different grounds by 
the psychologist Freud. The parent-child relationship, he said, is projected into 
the external world. It is this pathology, this illusion, which is behind all religion. 
Although it shares the common feature with the theory of Tylor of making religion a 
mistake, Freud's theory is essentially different in that it is non-rationalistic. The 
parent-child relationship is of an emotional order and the projection of it is sub-
conscious, binding and dictating to the reason. The greatest weakness of the theory. 
apart from its lack of empirical verification, is that it makes religion an individual 
matter, re-created afresh for each person, and so fails to account for its institutionalized 
nature. The theory does however provide a possible explanation of the compulsive 
character of religious ritual and religiously sanctioned codes of conduct and the idea 
that neurosis is involved in religion has, since the time of Freud, influenced the theories 
of many anthropologists. In order to show how this line of thought developed I wish 
to outline briefly one of these theories-that of the American anthropologist Paul 
Radin. 
Radin's theory explains religion as a blend of rational thought processes and 
abnormal psychology worked out in a social context. He believes that religion 
arose from magic through attempts" to understand and explain. . . the disease and 
death situation ".3 Magic, he says, is man's attempt at subjective coercion of objects 
in order to make nature oblige him. But he finds that sometimes objects act the 
other way and coerce him, as when he falls sick. Therefore there must be another 
agent external to himself also capable of influencing objects. This agent, which must 
2 William]. Goode, Religion Among the Pl'imitives (1951), p. 244. 
"Paul Radin, Primitive Religion (1937), p. 68. 
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he supernatural since it cannot be perceived, may cause the sickness either by intruding 
a foreign object into the body of the patient or by possessing the patient's soul. 
For the sick person to be cured the agent responsible for the sickness must be coerced 
or persuaded in the first case to stop his intrusions and in the second case to give up 
the soul. But who can undertake this coercion or persuasion of the external agent? 
There are in all human groups, says Radin, a certain number of persons who have 
what he calls a neurotic-epileptoid disposition. These persons are by their constitu-
tion prone to develop obsessions, experience seizures, trances and recovery to 
normality, behaviour which to others appears to be supernaturally caused. Because 
of this interpretation by others, these persons are able to capitalize on their affliction 
and gain a role in the social group as mediators with the spirits. 
Abnormal persons of this kind set the form of religion but once the form has 
been set and an avenue of success opened up enterprising persons who are not 
emotionally abnormal may seek to profit by it. In the more simply organized groups 
like the Arunta and the Eskimo, says Radin, the basic qualification of the shaman 
and the medicineman is that he belongs to the neurotic-epileptoid type. In more 
complex economic organizations, many normal people are attracted to the priesthood 
by the emoluments of office. But they have to accept the formulation of religious 
experience established by their neurotic predecessors. This formulation comprises 
three parts: (1) the description by the shaman of his neurotic temperament and his 
actual suffering and trance; (2) the description of his enforced isolation, physical 
and spiritual, from the rest of the group; (3) the detailed description of what might 
be called an obsessive identification with his goal. From the first part arose the 
theory of the ordeal through which the shaman must pass; from the second part 
arose the insistence upon taboos and purifications; and from the third part came the 
belief that the shaman was possessed by the goal, in other words, all that is connoted 
by concept of spirit-possession. 4 
Briefly, Radin's argument is that everyone has fear and uncertainty. First of 
all shamans and then an established priesthood exaggerated and capitalized on this 
fear and uncertainty: "The religious formulator developed the theory that every-
thing of value. . . was surrounded and immersed in danger; that these dangers 
could be overcome only in a specific fashion and according to a prescription devised 
and perfected by him."fi Everyone who has worked among primitive peoples knows 
that much of what Radin says about theories of disease and the nature of spiritual 
measures to counteract it is correct. Elements in the content of all developed 
religions also suggest primitive parallels of the kind he describes. But his theory 
has several serious weaknesses. 
The first weakness concerns the analysis of spirit-controlled behaviour in simple 
~ocieties of the kind in which Radin claims to have found the genesis of religious 
behaviour. It is true that persons who become shamans, or spirit-mediums, are 
• Ibid., pp. 131-2. 
'Ibid., p. 25. 
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usually abnormal in the sense that their behaviour is at variance from the standard 
behaviour of other members of the community. But often it seems that their 
abnormality consists only in their shamanistic behaviour and therefore it is not an 
explanation but a tautology to say that they are shamans because they are abnormal. 
When Radin speaks of the neurotic-epileptoid type he implies a more generalized 
disorder of the kind described by psychiatrists in Western society. If this form of 
abnormality existed in the shamans, one would expect it to be displayed in more 
widespread or repeated maladjustments. But frequently the shaman, once he has 
passed through his initial experience, can practise at will and at call and for all the 
rest of the time he is often a responsible member of the community--indeed sometimes 
a leader. This is a behaviour pattern hard to square with mental affliction of any 
severity. The theory that mental disturbance plays a part in the origin of religious 
behaviour cannot be dismissed but more study is needed to determine what that 
part is. There is the further point that sometimes the behaviour of the shaman 
is not even abnormal in the religious field. Radin mentions, although only in passing, 
the case of the Wintun, one of the several American Indian tribes in which supernatural 
experiences are obtained by a majority of the tribe. It is difficult to believe that the 
whole tribe have neurotic-epileptoid dispositions. 
The second weakness of Radin's theory is its assumption that the prototypes of 
complex religious institutions can be studied in the simple societies found in the world 
today. Most social anthropologists are most careful to avoid any such assumption. 
Although they frequently use the word "primitive" as a convenient term for the 
technologically simple and non-literate societies, they do not equate primitive in this 
sense with "primal", for they realize that most of these societies have as long a 
history as their own and that it is usually impossible to say when they came into 
existence and under what conditions. Radin is less careful and, because he relies 
too much upon an assumption of a historical sequence which he cannot demonstrate, 
his theory is not convincing as an explanation of religious phenomena in complex 
societies. Some of these phenomena may be products of the compJexity and not at 
all results of history. 
When most social anthropologists study modern primitive societies they do so 
because it is possible in these societies to isolate factors which it is difficult to isolate 
in complex societies. With the information thus gained the study can then be carried 
into more complex societies to see whether these same factors continue to operate 
in the same manner or whether the situation has been changed by new factors. 
Examined on this basis Radin's theory appears both to have analytical weaknesses 
and to leave a good deal unexplained. 
Radin suggests that the appeal of religious beliefs in simple societies is the relief 
they give to the ordinary man from fear and anxiety and the gain and power they 
give to the religious practitioner. Is this true of primitive societies? We may 
suggest that the picture it gives of individual motivation even in the simple societies 
is incomplete. Fear is undoubtedly a potent force in all religions. We see its 
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influence particularly in the Calvanistic varieties of Christianity and a recent writer 
in the Hibbert Jot/,rnal, Dr. S. G. F. Brandon, argues that" from what we know so 
far of man when he first emerges in the historical record, it would appear that religion 
originally stemmed from human consciousness of the temporal process, the menace 
of which was focussed in death but alleviated by the promise of new life manifest in 
the phenomenon of birth". 6 Amongst the social anthropologists Malinowski 
especially emphasized the fear of death and the longing for immortality as a motivating 
force in religious belief. But fear is surely not the only motive. There are others, 
and strong amongst them in all societies appears to be the intellectualistic desire for 
understanding. 
Radin is not unaware of this. He says there are" two general types of tempera-
ment among primitive peoples, that of the priest-thinker and that of the layman; 
the one only secondarily identified with action, the other primarily so; the one 
interested in the analysis of religious phenomena, the other in their effect". 7 That 
is to say, there is a religious interest for its O\ovn sake, apart from the motive of gain 
and power. But Radin does not pay much attention in his analysis to this motive 
and implies that at best it is only secondary. In the case of the Dayaks amongst 
whom I lived for two years I became at times strongly inclined to the belief that it 
was primary. In Dayak society priests were rewarded for their performances but 
the reward ,vas so small that it was little more than rather poor compensation for 
their labour. Nearly a third of the older men were priests-far too many for the 
majority of them to accumulate much prestige. They liked gain; they liked power; 
but not noticeably more so that the generality in their society. They took pride in 
their performances. They were enlightened by their own speculations. The best 
of them were artists and philosophers and in their own minds visionaries and 
theologians. 
Such motivation is more clearly evident in the case of the greater religions. 
In these greater religions the motives of gain and power play an obvious part. But 
it is never regarded as proper that they play the major part. When it happens that 
they do murmurs of corruption arise and the religion is ripe for a reformation which 
often comes from within the ranks of the priesthood itself. It would not be a valid 
argument to claim in support of Radin's analysis that the situation in respect to the 
greater religions is different from that in respect to the primitive religions. If his 
evolutionary theory is to explain adequately religious motivation it must cover all 
situations. 
The final criticism of Radin's theory which we wish to make is its comparative 
lack of attention to the social character of religion. Radin does not entirely neglect 
its social character. Fear, gain and power are individual motivations but they have 
social consequences. The majority of people in any society, he says, are usually 
6 S. G. F. Brandon, " The Origin of Religion ", The Hibbert Journal (1959), Vol. LVII, NO.4, 
p. 355· 
'Radin, ol'. cit., p. q. 
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non-religious. In the power structure of the tribe the priests form an upper stratum. 
Their motives are the enhancement of their own economic security and the strengthen-
ing of the authority of the elders, which usually implies strengthening their own. 
Once their position is secured they become strong supporters of the established social 
order. Nevertheless the motivation is individualistic and selfish and the social role 
of religion is a by-product of it. In view of the social importance of religion this 
hypothesis is unconvincing. 
We can now contrast Radin's theory with a group of theories which explain religion 
in purely social terms. The most important theorist in this group was the French 
sociologist Emile Durkheim. Writing at the turn of the century, he said that" religion 
is a social phenomenon". By this he did not mean simply that religious ideas, 
symbols and practices were expressed in social action and perhaps controlled it. 
He meant that society generated the religious concepts. According to his theory, 
men's living together in a group generates sentiments of solidarity. These sentiments 
constitute each individual person's awareness of his wider social personality. Felt, 
but their true origin not understood, they acquire a mystic supernatural importance. 
Expressed through ritual or symbolized in deities, the sentiments are intensified and 
the real social bonds are strengthened. 
In terms of such a theory it would be expected that ritual, which allows direct 
expression of the felt sentiments, should figure more largely in primitive religious 
systems than systematic beliefs, which are one degree further removed from the actual 
stuff of social life. Radcliffe-Brown, the first occupant of this Chair, and the great 
English exponent of Durkheim, says: "The social function of rites is obvious: by 
giving solemn and collective expression to them the rites reaffirm, renew and strengthen 
those sentiments on which the social solidarity depends."8 Many other anthro-
pologists have stressed ritual as the main feature of religion and almost relegated 
belief to the category of an unnecessary excressence. Speaking of the Australian 
Aborigines, who have elaborated ritual to an extent probably without parallel in 
primitive society, Stanner says that existence and being are mysteries. They were 
apparently understood by ancestors but men have only such information about them 
as the ancestors handed down. The continued maintenance of the ceremonies is a 
guarantee of a social life with a moral order. "The ancestors taught, and fathers 
from time out of mind have instructed their sons, that certain actions of living are 
carried out in certain ways."9 
It is not only in primitive religions that ritual is often more important than belief. 
Speaking of Judaism, Huston Smith argues that observance of ritual is more central 
than ideas. "In sinking the roots of his life deep into the past", he writes, " the Jew 
draws nourishment from events in which God's acts were clearly visible and in doing 
so keeps the deadly prosaicness of the God-eclipsed perspective at bay."lO Compare 
8 A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society (1952), p. 164. (The 
quotation was first made in the 1945 Henry Myers Lecture to the Royal Anthropological Institute 
of Great Britain and Ireland.) 
9 W. E. H. Stanner, " On Aboriginal Religion ", Oceania (1959), Vol. XXX, Pt. I, p. Il6. 
10 Huston Smith, The Religions of Man (1959), p. 259. 
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this with SLanner's statement on the Aborigines: "The aboriginal doctrine may be 
summed up in two statements which are accepted as great truths: in the beginning 
of things, life and death, and all things connected with them, took on the characters 
they now have because of marvellous events which took place once-for-all; living 
men should, indeed must, commemorate those events, and keep in touch with the 
consequences, by acts to signify and symbolize what happened and, somehow, keeps 
on happening. By such means men' follow up The Dreaming' through a repeated 
memorial of it."ll 
That ritual plays a larger part in some religious systems than explicit doctrine 
has been shown. But the case must not be pressed too far. As Goode remarks, 
rituals in themselves do not constitute a self-enclosed system. The gestures, words, 
objects, and movements derive significance from the meaning invested in them by the 
system of belief.12 In the Aboriginal case, as to some extent in the Judaic case, the 
reference point of the belief is an historical event rather than a theological concept. 
Acceptance of sacred tradition hallows life and circumstance. But sacredness is a 
quality of mind not of action. It implies belief in an authority which is supernatural 
in the sense that it interpenetrates the present in a mystic manner from a source 
beyond it. 
Certainly no generalization which will cover all societies can be made concerning 
the relative importance of ritual and belief. The apparent relative unimportance 
of the latter element in certain societies could in fact have been exaggerated by such 
generalizing as is absolutely necessary if useful statements are to be made about 
primitive societies. In a society which lacks an organized priesthood and lacks 
writing, both of which allow ideas to be easily communicated from person to person 
and from generation to generation, there is an enormous variation of ideas from one 
member of the society to another. A generalization made by an anthropologist 
about the whole society necessarily eliminates these variations and states only the 
common norm. This is often mainly the ritual and to this extent the generalization 
may differ from the reality. 
Even though it be true that ritual is the most prominent feature of religion in 
some societies, belief is an aspect of religion everywhere and in some religions it is a 
most important aspect. A valid sociological theory must take account of it and 
explain it. Durkheim does take account of it. He speaks of religion as "an 
integrated system of beliefs and practices which unite in one moral community all 
those who adhere to it "P And he explains the system by saying that it is generated 
by the social reality and in turn sustains the social reality. We could draw a parallel 
with a system of secular laws. The society develops the laws and the laws preserve 
the society. To assess the validity of the theory we must ask two questions. Is 
11 Stanner, op. cit., p. III. 
12 Goode, op. cit., p. 237. 
13 Emile Durkheim ,Lesformes etementaires de fa vie refigeuse (1912), 2nd Ed., Paris, F. Alcan, 
p. 65· 
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the system of beliefs simply a derivation from the social reality? Secondly, what is 
the effect upon the social reality of the system of beliefs? 
Concerning the first question, probably a majority of modern British social 
anthropologists would agree with Durkheim that religious ideas are in fact a derivation 
from the social reality. But consider the following statement from an illuminating 
article recently published by Professor Raymond Firth: "The Kelantan village 
Malays among whom spirit mediumship and shamanism are common, have no 
corporate descent groups. It is interesting then to note that the spirits possessing 
their mediums are not those of their ancestors, but an elaborate range of Indonesian, 
Hindu and Muslim god spirit characters not linked by kinship to the medium at all, 
but arranged in a loose hierarchy with much endowment of social and political titles. 
The Kalantan medium's spirit troop then reflects his social structure in its absence 
of kinship bonds and its free use of status labels. The Tikopia situation is almost the 
reverse. The society has corporate descent groups of patrilineage type, and strong 
links of persons with their matrilineal kin. While the system of chieftainship is 
given very great respect, there is a strong proliferation of titles in a status system. 
Correspondingly, there is a strong kin tie and specific lineal element in the Tikopia 
mediumship."14 
In the examples given we see that in the Tikopia case the spirit world does 
correspond to precise features of the social reality. If we were to consider that case 
alone, we might believe there is a causal relationship between the two. But when we 
consider the Kelantan case where the spirit world occurs without that correspondence 
except in a negative way, then it becomes clear that the reasons for the existence of 
the spirit world have not been fully explained. The use of the word" reflects" in 
this case cannot connote a causal relationship because all that is "reflected" is an 
absence. Professor Firth's examples do demonstrate excellently that in both societies 
there is a consistency between the overt social structure and the systematized beliefs, 
but they do not account for the beliefs. 
The danger of assuming that consistency implies a causal relationship is also 
present in the common statement that religious activity is" integrative" in a society. 
As religious activity is social activity, it must be integrated with, in the sense of being 
consistent with, other forms of social activity or else the society would be in a state 
of disharmony and probably unable to survive long. The mere statement that there 
is integration cannot therefore be taken as supplying a reason for the existence of 
religious activity. 
The claim that religious conceptions are a mirror image of the social structure 
has not been validated. This pillar of the sociological theory of religion therefore 
collapses. Religious ideas appear to be variously derived-from history and by 
hallucination, inventiveness or insight. Nevertheless if it can be shown that the 
ideas are meaningful only through the support they give to the social structure then 
14 Raymond Firth, " Problem and Assumption in the Anthropological Study of Religion", 
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (1959). Vol. 89. Pt. II. p. 142. 
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to this extent the sociological theory is correct. Let us therefore examine whether 
this is so by considering the second of the questions we posed earlier: what is the 
effect upon the social reality of the system of religious beliefs? 
Durkheim stated that the effect of a religion was to "unite in one moral com-
munity all those who adhere to it ".15 By a moral community is meant a community 
the members of which accept common moral values. Without some system of 
common values in a society social life would be impossible because there would be no 
predictability of behaviour on the part of other members of the community on which 
persons could count in their social relationships. But common values are of various 
types. Not all of them are moral. Some are economic, depending upon a rational 
appreciation of utility. Others are political, depending upon a calculation of power. 
All values of these and similar types, which can be justified by a rational accounting 
of self-interest by those who uphold them, we may classify into the one general 
category of empirical values. The values to which Durkheim refers belong to a 
different category. They are the moral values which, according to whether they are 
positive or negative, arouse emotions of approval or disapproval and oblige persons 
to perform or to refrain from certain actions. They are non-empirical because their 
acceptance is not based upon a rational calculation of self-interest. Every society 
has such a system of moral values. 
We may now examine the relationship between the moral values and religion. 
Durkheim implies that the main function of religion is to support the moral values. 
If we find that moral systems exist independently of religion, then his argument fails. 
Macbeath has examined anthropological reports on three primitive societies and 
concluded that there is in fact no inevitable relationship between moral and religious 
systems.16 We need, however, to press the analysis a little more closely. 
At the outset we may note that it is possible to discuss this question in more 
general terms than is sometimes believed. At first sight societies appear to differ 
greatly in their codes of behaviour. This has given rise to the belief that moral 
values are very largely relative to particular cultures and that no common system 
can be found. But closer examination shows that the relativity is far less than it 
seems on a superficial view. Let us consider an instance of apparently complete 
difference of value between two societies. In the society of the Trobriand Islands 
described by Malinowski unmarried persons are permitted complete sexual freedom.17 
In our own society sexual relations between the unmarried are held to be morally 
wrong. The opposition of values appears to be complete. But in fact both societies 
have a common area of sexual taboo. Both apply the restriction to classes of near 
kin and to married persons. The difference between the societies is not therefore 
in the nature of the taboo but in its range of application. Europeans extend it more 
widely. A Trobriand moralist might say we are more taboo-ridden. 
16 Durkheim, op. cit., p. 65. 
18 Alexander Macbeath, Experiments in Living (1952). 
17 Bronislaw Malinowski, The Sexual Life of Savages in North-Western Melanesia (1929). 
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Although anthropologists have rarely attempted the task, considering perhaps 
that it more properly belongs to the philosophers, it is almost certainly possible to 
find a core of moral values common to all societies. Relativity operates in a wide 
periphery around this core. We shall, therefore, speak of the relationship between 
religion and morality in general terms, although the testing of any theory developed 
must depend upon examination of particular societies. 
For the purposes of our analysis we may distinguish between negative and 
positive values, the former being the prohibitions or taboos and the latter those 
actions or sentiments which are considered desirable. Since they place restrictions 
upon behaviour to which persons may naturally incline, the negative values require 
sanctions. The sanctions may be legal but in the case of a true taboo system sanctions 
of a legal kind are at best secondary. The action concerned is regarded simply as 
something that is "not done". Yet there is a sanction behind it. In the vast 
majority of primitive societies there is a concept of supernatural retribution. I 
suspect there may be in all societies. The supernatural agency may not be conceived 
everywhere in terms of gods or spirits. There may just be a sense of evil consequence. 
Even this belief may be absent when the taboo is observed without questioning. But 
this does not take the taboo out of the realm of the supernatural. In one sense every 
ethical judgment is supernatural in that it is not deduced from the sense-experienced 
world. If we are prepared to regard implicit acceptance of the supernatural as 
religion, then religion always lies behind the taboos of primitive man. It lies behind 
many of the positive values also. In every society there are codes of conduct which 
preserve the community and frequently these codes are explicitly justified by religion. 
But there is one positive value into which religion often does not seem to be 
involved at the primitive level. Moreover this value is a central one in all moral 
systems. We spoke earlier of moral relativity operating around a common core. The 
centre of this common core is the very general value of respect, consideration or, for 
those who are willing to accept the term, " love" for one's fellow members of society. 
The range of the value varies but it is omnipresent. Always in primitive society 
people believe in the obligatory character of various forms of helpful behaviour 
towards particular kin and in a more general way towards all members of the com-
munity. Yet this central moral value is frequently not explicitly involved in religion. 
It is true that religion may be embryonically present in that the behaviour is sanctioned 
by tradition and the tradition often carries a supernatural quality of revelation, but 
the behaviour is rarely clearly thought of in religious terms. 
To gain some clues as to why this central value is not explicitly involved in 
religion in primitive societies we should examine the nature of those values into which 
religion does clearly enter. The special feature of the forms of activities involved in 
these values, it seems to me, is that they go beyond the facts of ordinary day-to-day 
activity in that they involve considerable restraints or constraints on behaviour. 
The restriction or direction of behaviour may be of three forms: (r) certain actions 
to which persons may incline are prohibited; (2) certain actions are required for the 
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general rather than for the personal benefit; (3) actions are required, or evoked, 
which are unusual or which demand an unusual degree of energy. 
We have already discussed the first class of actions-those which are prohibited 
by taboo-and found that religious concepts tend to be associated quite definitely 
with them. In regard to the second class of actions, community action could not 
eventuate unless there was a sense of group identity. The group concept is frequently 
symbolized in terms of a group god. Subsidiary to this main symbolization the 
particular interests which the group is pursuing at any moment may be given a divine 
sanction. Within a total society, too, there may be sub-groups with distinctive 
interests and these interests may become associated with religious distinctions. For 
example, last year a graduate of the Department of Anthropology, the Reverend 
Mr. Alan Dougan, made a survey of religious affiliations in the Bathurst district of 
New South Wales and found that the membership of the different Christian denomina-
tions tended to be associated with class and status differences. In circumstances 
where there is a great need for group cohesion and for justification of group member-
ship religion may become more than ordinarily important. In a recently published 
statistical survey of religious activity in Great Britain and the United States Argyle 
shows that "minority groups tend to have an above-average level of religious 
activity". In such cases the character of the group's needs gives character to the 
religious values it adopts. The minority groups, according to Argyle, adopt" forms 
of religion which are either completely other-worldly or aggressively critical of 
society ".18 
The third type of situation into which we have suggested religion enters is that 
in which there is a need for unusual activity or activity at an unusual level. Situations 
of this type may be various. Sometimes the religious concepts provide a rationale 
for behaviour the purpose of which, being remote, is difficult to keep in the forefront 
of the mind as a motive. Thus in primitive society it is common to find that spirits 
are believed to decree the division of activities into the periods which comprise the 
seasonal cycle, or that the effort required for a large production such as an ocean-
going canoe is conceived as pleasing the gods. It wouln probably be wrong to view 
all situations of this type as involving constraint on impulse. In some cases this 
is so. An analysis of primitive cultures suggests, however, that people yearn for 
special efforts, which give them pleasure and which they pursue with great enthusiasm, 
as for instance in the preparation of enormous feasts displaying rational concern 
neither for conservation of energy nor for their effects on their ordinary economy. 
But whether involving constraint or satisfying subconscious need, the activity 
requires a purpose and if this purpose cannot be understood in material terms then it 
is understood in non-empirical religious terms. 
The general model situation into which religion enters therefore has two features-
an abnormal activity pattern (restraint on behaviour, constraint or the evocation of 
unusual activity) and a lack of rational explanation for the activity in terms of self-
18 Michael Argyle. Religious Behaviour (1958), p. 134. 
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interest. If either of these features alters, then religion is less likely to enter. 
Situations may in fact change rapidly, resulting in loss of one or other of the features. 
For instance, as members of a group gain in education and as practical opportunities 
for improvement of their condition occur, their aims may become material and a 
longer vision of self-interest may be sufficient to unite them in common purpose. 
The theologian Niebuhr remarks: "It is a striking fact that the revolutionary 
tendencies of the poor in the nineteenth century were almost completely secular in 
character, while in the preceding eras they were always largely religious in nature. "19 
The same type of development can be seen in the case of primitive peoples in contact 
with the industrial world. For example, in the lightly contacted areas of Melanesia 
the effort to achieve the wealth and status of the Europeans takes the form of cargo 
cults, but in Fiji, where the population is literate and knowledge of the Western world 
is greater, the era of cargo cults seems to be over and the major group efforts to 
improve conditions are now secular. What has happened in these cases is that 
values have moved out of the realm of the non-empirical into the empirical, that 
is to say out of the spiritual realm into the mundane. Thus religion is an ever-
changing phenomenon. As material opportunity develops it tends to decline. 
However, if the suggestion we made earlier regarding the yearning for abnormal 
achievement is correct, we may expect it to revive in some form should conditions 
of material satiation be reached. And the problem of the non-empirical remains, 
unsolved, as we shall argue in a moment, in a very basic sphere. 
We are now in a position to suggest, in terms of the previous analysis, the reasons 
why the central value of society, consideration for one's fellows, is often not explicitly 
involved in religion at the primitive level. Durkheim, you will remember, said that 
religion comprised " an integrated system of beliefs which unite in one moral com-
munity all those who adhere to it ". The issue here is clearly made the morality 
of the community but as we have seen the morality of the community is one of the 
least of the concerns of religious belief in primitive societies. Why is this so ? 
What we have found from our analysis is that in primitive religions, as indeed 
in all religions, religious concepts enter when there is a need to restrain, constrain or 
evoke behaviour for purposes which are not easily or immediately explicable-that 
is to say where there is a puzzle, or rather where there would be a puzzle were not the 
supernatural answer provided. The morality of the community is not generally a 
religious concern in primitive societies because it is not yet a conscious puzzle. It 
is not a puzzle because in small-scale societies where relationships are based upon close 
ties of kinship or neighbourhood, reiterated daily in face-to-face meetings in a hundred 
and one activities, and where there is a homogeneity of attitudes, obligations are 
accepted with little question and a general traditional sanction for the behaviour 
is usually enough. 
But there is a potential puzzle, for moral behaviour is non-rational. Talcott 
Parsons makes an important criticism of the Durkheimian theory when he says: 
10 H. Richard Niebuhr, The Social Sources of Denominationalism (1957), p. 72. 
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" the empirical, observable entity' society' is understandable only in terms of men's 
ideas of and active attitudes towards the non-empirical. If the 'equation ' is to 
be accepted at all the significant way of putting it is not 'religion is a social 
phenomenon' so much as 'society is a religious phenomenon '."20 
As society becomes more complex and social relations demand a conscious 
morality, the potential puzzle becomes real. In this respect religion must be seen as 
an emergent development. Therefore it cannot be accounted for, in the way that 
Radin seeks to account for it, as a survival from primitive stages of society. As 
society changes religion declines in some spheres and develops in others, its enduring 
roles being to provide explanation and to give purpose. 
All the greater religions show concern with the central problem of the restraint of 
selfish desire for the social good. The problem is a real, inescapable one. To analyse 
fully the answers offered to it would take us far beyond the present hour, day or year. 
Broadly they appear to fall into three categories. One category is typified by the 
theory of scientific humanism. This theory appears to me to amount to a combination 
of the arguments of Durkheim and Darwin. I may not do it justice, but it seems to 
depend upon two principal propositions: (1) Men may subserve the interests of 
society at the expense of their immediate self-interest because an ordered society 
gives far greater benefits in the long run to its members than would social anarchy. 
(2) Men act in this way because it is in their nature to do so. One variant of the 
theory would have this nature inborn in the persons and another would have the 
persons born" little savages" but acquiring the nature through education by their 
seniors. In both cases the support for the proposition is the evolutionary hypothesis 
that those societies survived, and ensured the survival of their members, in which 
social motivation was strong. 
Each of the propositions of scientific humanism is open to criticism. The 
ultimate good served by society is a majority good and individual persons who do 
most for it, at the expense perhaps of their lives, may receive no reward in terms of 
self-interest. To say that sacrifice is itself rewarding to self-interest because it pleases 
the nature of man, be this nature inborn or conditioned, is to have recourse to the 
second proposition. But this proposition implies slavery to nature and is more 
appropriate to insect society than to the ideal society of free men which humanists 
generally claim to support. What of the man with emancipated intelligence who 
declines to accept sacrifice? Either he must be allowed freedom to follow his self-
interest as he sees it or society must make demands upon him. In the latter case 
there must be an organ of authority to make the decision for him and to decide what 
is right for the general good, sacrificing members of the society if necessary in pursuit 
of it. Scientific humanism would appear, therefore, to be a type of philosophy 
consistent with either an " I'm all right, Jack" type of behaviour or an authoritarian 
society. It provides no logical justification for the main value of non-authoritarian 
societies which is the sanctity of the individual person. It is very difficult to get 
:!O Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (rst Ed., 1937), 1949, p. 427. 
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away from moral values. In fact the authoritarian, totalitarian societies all elevate 
sacrifice into a mystic value and so involve themselves, to my mind, in a massive 
con tradiction. 
The second category of answers to the basic problem of social morality is 
agnosticism. The values are accepted intuitively but their nature is left mysterious. 
On the very wide definition of the supernatural as the non-empirical this view at least 
borders on religion but it involves no concept of deity. 
The third category is the explicitly religious. This is a type of answer which 
apparently can he found only by illusion, insight, revelation, or faith. No rational 
road to it has yet been found and many famous thinkers have failed in the attempt to 
discover one, or have declared the effort futile. The Buddha declined to pronounce 
upon the reality of the gods, saying: "Consider as unexplained what I have not 
explained." Prot agoras made no pretence of wisdom. He said: "Concerning 
the gods I can say nothing, neither that they exist or that they do not exist; nor of 
what form they are: because there are many things which prevent one from knowing 
that, namely both the uncertainty of the matter and the shortness of one's life." 
The social anthropologist cannot say much more. He can show something of 
the part the gods have played in human society. He can show how moral concepts 
have developed in conjunction with concepts of the deity. He can tell us a good deal 
about the nature and conditions of religious beliefs, the forms they take and partly 
why they take them, their social implications and the social contexts in which they 
have value. All this may help to advance human understanding. But the main 
purpose of this paper has been to show that the theories of the social anthropologists 
come to the same conclusion as those of the philosophers-they cannot explain 
religion. They may perhaps justify an agnosticism. They cannot by themselves 
prove either a theology or an atheism. 
There is one final point I wish to make. We spoke first of theories which sought 
to explain religion as a personal matter, but we dealt with them only critically in 
order to show their inadequacy to account for the social aspects of religion. This 
did less than justice to their merits. Religion is both a personal and a social matter, 
and a few other things besides. When religion in its broadest sense is equated with 
the supernatural, everything which is supernatural or non-empirical gets tossed into 
the religious classification as though it were a great sack-morality, miracles, visions, 
immortality beliefs, fate and the immaterial substance of griefs, hopes and fears. 
Priests and philosophers tip out the contents and sort them into apparent order. 
Perhaps one school of wise men has sorted only one part of the bag and another school 
another pact, or their sortings overlap, thus bringing confusion to the work of those 
who take their classifications as starting-points for further analysis. The problems 
in studying religion may therefore be partly logical problems due to the enforcing of 
an order upon phenomena which have no consistent order. Sophisticated observers 
are sometimes puzzled by the fact that members of primitive societies have no 
coherent doctrine for all their magical and religious activities. The primitives may 
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in fact be the true sophisticates. But for the rest of us the sorting has now gone on 
for two millennia, creating a new religious reality. 
The role of the social anthropologist in regard to religion is to study it empirically 
in its social aspects, not to assess the theological worth of the beliefs. If tonight I 
have stepped beyond this role it is because occasionally every student of every 
department of human affairs should look at the broader meaning of his findings in 
order to see them in perspective . 
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